Ramses primary sources — 2026-05-07

Project

  • Name: Ramses
  • URL: https://ramses.exchange/
  • Category: concentrated-liquidity DEX / x(3,3) governance market / MEV-capture routing layer
  • Whitepaper status: No canonical standalone whitepaper surfaced in this pass.

Primary sources reviewed

  1. Docs home: https://docs.ramses.xyz/

    • Frames Ramses as a concentrated-liquidity layer and DEX powered by x(3,3).
    • Points to the core surfaces that matter most here: tokenomics, xRAM, concentrated liquidity, MEV, audits, and multichain architecture.
  2. Tokenomics page: https://docs.ramses.xyz/pages/tokenomics

    • Shows the initial distribution, including a heavy community and Hyperliquid-community skew.
    • Describes the declining weekly-emissions schedule and the later elastic-emissions regime that can move emissions up or down based on protocol revenue.
    • Says all emissions go to gauges, which keeps liquidity voting at the center of the monetary system.
  3. xRAM page: https://docs.ramses.xyz/pages/xram

    • Describes xRAM as a non-transferable escrowed governance token and hyperRAM as its liquid-staked wrapper.
    • Says converting RAM into xRAM burns 50% of RAM and that direct exit returns RAM at a 1:0.5 ratio.
    • Explains that hyperRAM auto-votes, auto-compounds, and is intended to make governance participation liquid and low-maintenance.
    • Useful because it shows Ramses mutating ve(3,3) away from long lockups and toward wrapper-mediated participation plus explicit burn economics.
  4. Concentrated-liquidity page: https://docs.ramses.xyz/pages/concentrated-liquidity

    • Frames Ramses as an orderbook-style AMM built around concentrated liquidity and “competitive farming.”
    • Says fee distribution for CL pools defaults to 100% to xRAM voters.
    • Shows the protocol’s attempt to combine UniV3-style capital efficiency with governance-routed fee capture.
  5. MEV page: https://docs.ramses.xyz/pages/mev

    • Describes permissioned AMO/backrun engines that claim to capture value otherwise lost to external searchers.
    • Says arbitrage profits are routed back to protocol participants, especially hyperRAM/xRAM holders.
    • Analytically important because protocol revenue here depends partly on privileged execution infrastructure rather than only on open AMM usage.
  6. Audits / architecture page: https://docs.ramses.xyz/pages/audits

    • Says pools remain immutable and permissionless.
    • Also documents explicit access-control roles for admins, protocol operators, and swap-fee setters.
    • Notes operator authority around gauge status and governance whitelisting, which reveals a real administrative layer around the market design.

Mechanism takeaways

  • Ramses is useful because it mutates the standard ve(3,3) script in several directions at once: concentrated-liquidity accounting, burn-filtered governance entry/exit, liquid staking of governance, and protocol-native MEV capture.
  • The key comparison is not just “another Solidly fork.” It is a system where lockers and wrapper users sit closer to the fee sink than LPs, and where value capture increasingly depends on automated operators.
  • The liquid-staked governance wrapper is especially important: hyperRAM can become the default vote-routing surface, which means practical control may centralize in wrapper logic and operator behavior rather than in many direct xRAM voters.
  • The MEV layer also changes the usual analysis. Instead of letting outside arbitrageurs capture value, Ramses tries to internalize that extraction and redirect it into protocol economics. That can improve alignment, but it also creates a privileged-operator dependency.
  • The exit-burn design suggests a different answer to the old ve(3,3) lockup problem: rather than forcing long illiquidity, Ramses makes flexibility available but expensive, turning churn into a supply sink that benefits remaining participants.

Why this stays in the active corpus

  • Ramses adds a live x(3,3) mutation to the Solidly / ve(3,3) comparison set rather than another generic CLMM.
  • It strengthens reasoning about how governance markets change when concentrated liquidity, liquid staking, burn-based entry/exit, and permissioned MEV are bundled into one economic stack.