MEV-Share

• Name: MEV-Share
• URL: https://docs.flashbots.net/flashbots-mev-share/introduction
• Category: order-flow-auction protocol / programmable-privacy infrastructure / MEV-redistribution middleware
• Tags: ethereum-ecosystem
• Summary: MEV-Share is a programmable private-orderflow market layered on top of the Flashbots stack. The useful cut is narrower than a generic MEV marketplace: who gets to inspect selected order flow, what hints they receive, and how much of the resulting MEV gets kicked back to the flow originator.
• What it does:
  • Defines open interfaces for order-flow providers, searchers, MEV-Share Nodes, and blockspace providers to coordinate programmable private order flow
  • Lets users and wallets submit private transactions or bundles while choosing privacy hints and refund preferences
  • Streams selected transaction information to searchers so they can bid on backruns without always seeing full transaction contents
  • Extends bundle APIs with privacy settings, validity conditions, nested bundles, and refund configuration via mev_sendBundle
  • Redistributes a share of extracted MEV back to the originating user, wallet, dapp, or other configured recipients rather than leaving all value with builders, searchers, and validators
• Key claims:
  • The Flashbots docs define MEV-Share as an open-source protocol for users, wallets, and applications to internalize the MEV their transactions create through an order-flow auction
  • The protocol README explicitly says MEV-Share is an open-source protocol, not a product or company, and positions it as a credibly neutral alternative to proprietary exclusive order flow
  • The introduction docs say users can selectively share transaction data with searchers, who bid to include those transactions in bundles, and that users can choose how the bid is redistributed among themselves, validators, or other parties
  • The bundle docs make the control surface concrete: mev_sendBundle supports inclusion predicates, nested bundle composition, post-execution refund rules, privacy hints, and builder allowlists
  • The same docs say MEV-Share Nodes simulate searcher bundles and forward successful ones to builders along with conditions that a specified percentage of the generated MEV be paid back to the user or configured recipients
  • Flashbots Protect docs show MEV-Share functioning as infrastructure beneath a wallet-facing product surface, where users trade off privacy hints against expected refunds
  • The protocol is analytically useful because it separates three usually-blurred questions: who originates order flow, who is allowed to inspect it, and who gets paid when that flow produces extractable value
• Whitepaper: No canonical standalone whitepaper surfaced in this pass. The strongest primary materials were the Flashbots docs, the protocol README/spec repo, and the Flashbots Protect MEV-refunds documentation collected in ../whitepapers/mev-share-primary-sources-2026-05-08.md.
• Sources:
  • https://docs.flashbots.net/flashbots-mev-share/introduction
  • https://docs.flashbots.net/flashbots-mev-share/searchers/understanding-bundles
  • https://docs.flashbots.net/flashbots-protect/mev-refunds
  • https://github.com/flashbots/mev-share
  • https://raw.githubusercontent.com/flashbots/mev-share/main/README.md
  • https://github.com/flashbots/mev-share/blob/main/specs/bundles/v0.1.md

Internal linkages

• Historical baseline it tries to rebalance rather than replace: flashbots-auction.

• Strongest adjacent rights-market contrasts: express-relay and timeboost.

• Useful cut: keep this note on privacy hints and refund policy, not every bundle-market cousin.

• Last reviewed: 2026-06-03 UTC