Summary: MEV Blocker is best understood not as a generic “safe RPC,” but as a wallet-facing order-flow auction and private routing layer for Ethereum transactions. Its primary materials describe a system that pulls user flow out of the public mempool, forwards it to builders and searchers through a controlled private pipeline, lets searchers compete for backrunning rights, and returns a large share of resulting value to users and flow originators. That makes it a useful comparison class for Shutter and Primev/mev-commit: instead of threshold encryption or preconfirmation commitments, MEV Blocker protects users by structuring who can see order flow, on what terms, and how resulting MEV rents are redistributed.
What it does:
Offers Ethereum RPC endpoints that route transactions away from the public mempool to reduce exposure to frontrunning and sandwich attacks
Runs an order-flow auction in which searchers compete to backrun protected transactions, with docs and homepage materials saying users can receive up to 90% of resulting backrun value as rebates
Forwards transactions directly to major builders for fast inclusion, while exposing multiple endpoint options that trade off speed, privacy, revert protection, and rebate maximization
Uses a private-mempool design where transaction details can be selectively hidden, signatures removed and re-added, and fake transactions mixed into shared flow to make malicious searcher behavior less reliable
Redistributes some builder-fee value back to order-flow originators through gas-rebate mechanics rather than treating the RPC only as a protective filter
Key claims:
The docs introduction defines MEV Blocker as an RPC endpoint that protects transactions from frontrunning and sandwiching while offering rebates from backrunning via an order-flow auction
The homepage frames the product as broad-spectrum Ethereum transaction protection for DeFi, NFT minting, and general dapp use, emphasizing that users can add it directly at the wallet RPC layer
The order-flow-auction docs make the mechanism explicit: searchers bid to backrun user flow, builders pay to access flow, and the winning searcher is selected based on rebate value to users rather than only validator payment
Those same docs show MEV Blocker as more than a private relay: it is a structured routing market with rules around builder bonds/dues, searcher access, fake-transaction obfuscation, and refund distribution
The gas-rebates docs position MEV Blocker as a system for recapturing value from Ethereum’s PBS-era fee path, not just blocking harmful MEV but also refunding part of otherwise-lost priority-fee / builder-fee value
The homepage explicitly says the project is open to all searchers and builders, and names CoW Protocol, Agnostic Relay, and Beaver Build as original maintainers; newer homepage copy also notes that Special Mechanisms Group acquired the RPC infrastructure in 2026
The public web repo reinforces that MEV Blocker is a live integration surface, not only a concept page, with production-facing wallet/RPC setup, docs content, and endpoint-specific UX
Whitepaper: No canonical standalone whitepaper or litepaper surfaced in this pass. The strongest primary materials were the homepage, official docs, order-flow-auction and gas-rebate pages, public web repo, and acquisition memo; see ../whitepapers/mev-blocker-primary-sources-2026-05-08.md.