Scam Sniffer

  • Name: Scam Sniffer
  • URL: https://www.scamsniffer.io/
  • Category: anti-scam company / phishing-detection and signing-risk operator / threat-intelligence distribution provider
  • Tags: ethereum-ecosystem
  • Summary: Scam Sniffer belongs as an entity note, not a protocol note. The useful question is who labels malicious domains, scores risky signing flows, decides which checks and third-party signals matter, controls freshness and paid-versus-delayed distribution, and packages those verdicts into extensions and partner APIs. The real control surface is the company-run anti-scam classification and feed-distribution stack in front of wallet interactions.
  • What it does:
    • Runs a browser extension that warns on phishing sites and suspicious signing flows
    • Sells malicious-website detection, blacklist, and threat-intelligence APIs to wallets and other crypto products
    • Publishes an open-source scam-database repo with phishing domains and addresses, but with a built-in delay relative to the paid real-time feed
    • Documents a transaction-precheck stack that combines domain checks, contract inspection, transaction simulation, suspicious-address checks, malicious-code checks, and sign-request checks
    • Publishes public scam research and drainer-loss reporting that also reinforces its role as a feed and classification operator rather than only a browser-extension brand
  • Key claims:
    • The homepage says Scam Sniffer aims to enhance anti-scam capability of individual users and markets both end-user protection plus API products for partners
    • Official materials present Scam Sniffer as both a malicious-website detection provider and a blacklist API vendor for safer browsing and signing experiences
    • The docs describe a layered security-check pipeline using domain analysis, contract checks, Tenderly-based simulation, suspicious-address lookups, malicious-code detection, and sign-request checks, which means the judgment surface is broader than a static phishing list
    • The docs explicitly reference outside data and services such as Etherscan, Tenderly, SlowMist, and GoPlus inside the evaluation flow, making signal selection and composition part of the operator boundary
    • The open-source scam-database repo says blacklist data is refreshed every 24 hours but published with a 7-day delay, while real-time access is sold through a premium API; that freshness split is a real authority and distribution choice, not just pricing trivia
    • Public site statistics and research outputs reinforce that downstream users often encounter Scam Sniffer as a live source of labeling and warning decisions rather than as a neutral public dataset
  • Whitepaper: No classic whitepaper or litepaper is the important artifact here. The useful primary-source snapshot is ../whitepapers/scam-sniffer-primary-sources-2026-04-25.md.
  • Sources:

Why this company note belongs in the corpus

  • Scam Sniffer is analytically stronger as an operator note than as a project note because the meaningful question is not what product page does it have? but who decides what counts as a malicious domain, suspicious sign request, or risky transaction for downstream wallets and users?
  • The company boundary matters because Scam Sniffer does not merely expose a browser extension. It maintains the labeling pipeline, composes outside signals, decides update cadence, and controls which consumers get real-time versus delayed intelligence.
  • That makes Scam Sniffer a recurring offchain control-surface note rather than a generic anti-phishing app. The preserved question is who gets to classify, distribute, and monetize the warning stream that other products may start treating as policy truth.

Internal linkages

Protocol / company boundary

  • There is no especially clean standalone Scam Sniffer protocol boundary doing the analytical work here.
  • The useful surface is the company-run domain labeling, transaction-precheck composition, blacklist publication, extension and API distribution, and premium-versus-delayed feed policy that sits between raw web content and downstream wallet or user action.
  • That is why Scam Sniffer belongs in companies/: the real control question is who authors and distributes the anti-scam verdict workflow, not whether one extension, API endpoint, or research page can be described as a product.

Control surface

  • Practical leverage sits in domain classification, suspicious-address labeling, simulation quality, third-party signal selection, warning thresholds, blacklist freshness, and the exact split between paid real-time access and delayed public data.

  • Additional leverage sits in how partner integrations convert Scam Sniffer output into advice, friction, or hard stops for users.

  • None of that is onchain. The visible extension warning is only the last inch of the stack; authority already accumulated when Scam Sniffer decided what counted as suspicious enough to publish and how quickly that verdict should propagate.

  • Treat Scam Sniffer as anti-scam policy and feed-distribution infrastructure, not as a neutral protocol primitive.

  • Last reviewed: 2026-08-08 UTC